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I
Although Chan, or Zen, Buddhism traditionally claimed itself as a special transmis-
sion outside doctrinal teachings that eschews the written word, it has long been 
praised for its improvisational, atypical, intriguing, and intricate use of words. Prom-
inent Chan masters are characteristically skillful in employing paradoxical and 
aporetic phrases, figurative and poetic expressions, negations, questions, repetitions, 
and so forth, to express their thoughts, indicate their awakened states of mind, cut off 
the interlocutor’s habitual dualistic thinking, or evoke in him or her an experience of 
awakening. This fact, among others, has led some contemporary scholars to claim 
that the Chan experience of awakening does not really go beyond language, but 
rather has language deeply imbedded in it.1
Chinese Chan masters in the Tang dynasty (618–907 c.e.) generally considered 
one’s original mind (benxin 本心) to be broadly ineffable.2 They stress that the expe-
rience of awakening cannot be transmitted by means of words, and that no linguistic 
understanding can hope to simulate and replace the experience. In addition, the use 
of words seduces one into reifying their referents, taking the latter to be real, substan-
tial, and distinctly demarcated entities, which induces an attitude of attachment to 
the referents that the masters clearly dismiss. There is also a tendency to adhere 
to the words heard and their literal meanings and to fail to go beyond them to 
 comprehend the significance that the speaker intends to convey but has difficulty 
putting into words. There thus arises Chan’s well-known emphasis on the limita-
tions of language.3
However, as Chan Buddhism aims to transcend all kinds of dualistic thinking, it 
must also forsake the duality of language and the ineffable. The Tang dynasty Chan 
master Huangbo Xiyun 黃檗希運 (751?–850?) proclaimed that “speaking is silence, 
silence is speaking; speaking and silence are nondual,” thereby dismantling the du-
ality of speech and any ineffable state of silence.4 Likewise, Dazhu Huihai asserted 
that there is no original mind separated from speech.5 In our conscious life, it seems, 
language is ever-present, either explicitly or tacitly, and it mediates our relationships 
with others and the world around us. Then, we may expect Chan Buddhism to value 
various modes of expression and exploit fitting linguistic strategies rather than simply 
to pass over the ineffable in silence.6
The Platform Sūtra of the Sixth Patriarch is traditionally thought to contain the 
autobiography and teachings of Huineng 惠能 (638–713), considered to be the sixth 
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patriarch of Chinese Chan Buddhism. For decades, however, international scholars 
have generally agreed that the Platform Sūtra could not have been spoken by Huineng, 
and that its biographical stories are largely fictional.7 Even so, this sūtra remains a 
seminal and central text for exploring Chan in the Tang dynasty. According to this 
sūtra, Huineng repudiates any attachment to the emptiness (kong 空) of the mind as 
well as the forms (xiang 相) of the myriad objects. He is depicted as commenting that 
people who attach themselves to emptiness “slander [scriptural] teachings and say 
they make no use of words. As they say so, they should not even speak, for speech is 
itself a form of words.”8 The authors of the Platform Sūtra, it seems, are acutely aware 
of the predicament in which one finds oneself when speaking of something that it is 
beyond words. This sūtra’s principal teaching of no-thought (wunian 無念) strongly 
opposes the extinction of thought and asks one to live in a dynamic flow of succes-
sive thoughts without becoming attached to their objects or engaging in dualistic 
thinking.9 Correlatively, the authors would oppose sheer reticence and ask one to use 
words freely while foreclosing any attachment to, and dualistic understanding of, the 
related concepts and referents.
In this context, let us pay special attention to the linguistic strategy in the Plat-
form Sūtra that is said to have been taught by Huineng to his pupils in his last days, 
a strategy that centers on thirty-six pairs of things and is to be used for teaching the 
doctrine of Chan Buddhism. This strategy is not employed explicitly in the rest of the 
sūtra. However, it does reflect a characteristic Chan way of thinking in the earlier 
phase of the tradition and thereby warrants detailed investigation. In this essay, I at-
tempt to offer a philosophical analysis and rational reconstruction of the strategy and 
the correlated thinking. For this purpose, I also appeal to texts that putatively record 
the sayings of a number of Tang dynasty Chan masters whose thoughts are close or 
related to those of the Platform Sūtra.10 With this approach we inevitably go beyond 
the Chan Buddhist predilection toward praxis. Nevertheless, such philosophical 
 engagement should help to reveal dimensions of (Southern) Chan’s linguistic tactics 
and style of thought that have hitherto not been explored fully.11
For Chan masters, all linguistic expressions are provisional, to be negated espe-
cially when one sticks to their literal meaning or becomes attached to their referents. 
Their usefulness often lies in their therapeutic, heuristic, and evocative effectiveness. 
In this context, Chan’s encounter dialogue is fraught with unreasonable phrases 
and disruptive actions, such as beating and shouting, which seem to make rational 
analysis difficult. However, as we now know, perplexing improvisational encounter 
dialogues that appear in the sayings of Tang Chan masters are generally interpola-
tions made in the post-Tang era. Thus, we will not consider such dialogues except in 
section 4 below, and a rational reconstruction as attempted here should at least be 
feasible. Still, one may keep in mind the provisional and practical character of Chan 
discourse and view the strategy of the Platform Sūtra not as a strictly fixed method but 
as a pedagogic expedient open to different applications.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. In section 2, I translate and 
explain briefly four key passages in the Platform Sūtra that show the linguistic  strategy. 
In section 3, I analyze the strategy in some detail in light of the sūtra and the teach-
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ings of several Tang Chan masters. In section 4, I elucidate the correlated way of 
thinking and discuss certain related issues. Section 5 concludes the essay.
II
In the Platform Sūtra, Huineng’s teaching on the linguistic strategy begins with the 
following advice to his pupils, which will be referred to as quotation A:
A. I now teach you how to explain the doctrine [of Chan] without deviating from its 
 spirit. You refer to the three classifications of things and make use of the thirty-six pairs. 
Wherever you are, stay away from the two sides. Whatever you speak, do not diverge 
from nature and form (xingxiang 性相). If someone asks you about the doctrine, your 
speech should involve pairs of things. The two things [of each pair] are mutually depen-
dent for their presence and absence. They are ultimately eliminated, having no place 
whatsoever to turn to.12
In the passage that follows, the text clarifies that “the three classifications of things” 
means the five aggregates (skandhas: matter, feeling, perception, mental formation, 
and consciousness), the twelve bases of consciousness (āyatanas: the six internal 
senses and their respective objects), and the eighteen elements (dhātus). These are 
among the most fundamental categories in Buddhism. The focus is on the eighteen 
elements, which consist of the six consciousnesses (of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, 
and mental consciousness), the six internal senses (seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, 
touching, and thinking), and the corresponding six kinds of objects (visibles, sounds, 
smells, tastes, tangibles, and mental objects). All these items — indeed, the myriad 
things — are said to be contained in one’s self-nature as original mind and also 
emerge from it.13 It is indicated that a person who has awakened to self-nature, act-
ing  directly from it, knows best how to employ these eighteen types of things in the 
right way.
Then the text divides the thirty-six pairs into three groups: “insentient external 
objects,” “language and the characteristics of things,” and “functions that arise 
from self-nature.” Under the first group, “insentient external objects,” are five pairs: 
heaven and earth, sun and moon, darkness and light, yin and yang, and water and 
fire. The second group, “language and the characteristics of things,” has twelve pairs 
that include among them the conditioned and the unconditioned, the formed and the 
formless, matter and emptiness, motion and rest, profane and sacred, and long and 
short. Here, the term “language” presumably means concept or notion. Finally, there 
are nineteen pairs under the third group, “functions that arise from self-nature”: right 
and wrong, ignorance and wisdom, real (shi 實) and unreal (xu 虛), affliction and 
enlightenment, arising and perishing, nature and form, and dharma body and physi-
cal body, to name just some of them.14
Plainly, the parings in the first group suggest the strong influence of Chinese 
 culture. The second group involves conceptual contraries as well as things of con-
trary nature. The third group concerns mainly, but not exclusively, the state or func-
tioning of mind and body. These pairings have cultural and religious contexts and 
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are far from being exhaustive or conclusive. Therefore, we need not here examine 
the  adequacy of such classifications. The point to note is that each of the thirty-six 
pairs consists of items that in their proper context are regarded as contrary to 
each  other.
After listing the thirty-six pairs, the Platform Sūtra has Huineng explain their 
 employment and significance. Here is quotation B:
B. If you know how to employ these thirty-six pairs of things, you can understand all the 
sūtras, and wherever you are, you stay away from the two sides. How should one, acting 
from self-nature, employ these pairs to speak with others? Outwardly, while within forms, 
be free from forms. Inwardly, while within emptiness, be free from emptiness. If you cling 
to emptiness, you will only increase ignorance. If you cling to forms, you will only 
 increase wrong views.15
In the next section, we shall see in greater detail how one can rightly understand and 
make good use of the pairs. Clearly, the best option is to awaken to one’s self-nature 
and understand and employ the pairs in accordance with that nature. However, this 
is also the hardest thing to do for those of us who are not enlightened. Here, the sūtra 
stresses nonattachment, which is a state of mind that one can cultivate even if one 
is not awakened.16 Outwardly, one engages with external objects of various forms; 
inwardly, one feels one’s mind like empty space. Yet, one does not attach oneself to 
the forms of the objects or the emptiness of the mind. In a spirit of nonattachment, 
one continues to experience things around one and have words with others, while 
knowing how to make good use of the thirty-six pairs.
In this connection, we need to go beyond our Dunhuang text and cite a pas-
sage from the Daijōji version, which would help make the linguistic strategy more 
complete:17
C. Take the case in which someone asks you the meaning [of a term]. If he asks about 
“existence,” answer with “nonexistence”; if he asks about “nonexistence,” answer with 
“existence.” If he asks about “profane,” answer with “sacred”; if he asks about “sacred,” 
answer with “profane.” . . . As the two things depend on each other, there arises the idea 
of the middle way.
This quotation C suggests that an awareness of the interdependence between the two 
things or concepts of a pair may give rise to the idea of the middle way of nonduality.
Toward the end of this whole teaching, Huineng is depicted as explaining the 
interdependence of the two things of a pair in the following passage D:18
D. Darkness is not darkness by itself; it is darkness by virtue of light. Light is not light by 
itself; it is light by virtue of darkness. [Darkness occurs] when light changes and becomes 
darkness. [Likewise with light. In addition, with light darkness is revealed;] with darkness 
light is revealed. [Thus, darkness and light] are mutually dependent for their presence and 
absence. The thirty-six pairs are all like this.
“Darkness and light” is one of the thirty-six pairs, and much of what is said here 
should apply to the rest of the pairs. In the next section I attempt, on the basis of the 
four quotations, to analyze and reconstruct the linguistic strategy.
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III
It seems to me that the gist of the aforecited four quotations can be summed up in 
these four themes:
T1. Presenting the two things that form a pair.
T2. Showing the interdependence of the two things.
T3. Elimination of the two things in opposition.
T4. Realization of the middle way of nonduality.
In what follows, I discuss these themes in order, with a view to analyzing and recon-
structing the linguistic strategy of the Platform Sūtra.
In quotation A, Huineng’s pupils are instructed, when asked about the doctrine 
of Chan, to speak of the things that constitute one or some of the thirty-six pairs. So 
we have T1 as the presenting of the two things that form a pair. This move, it seems, 
is made in order to show the interdependence of the things or to negate them. What 
is more intriguing is quotation C, wherein the pupils are instructed, when asked 
about one of the two things of a pair, to reply with the name of the other. Here, the 
presenting is made together by the questioner and the Chan master.
Such a practice can be seen in the two passages from a text traditionally 
 attributed to Dazhu Huihai:
Question: “What is the unconditioned?” Answer: “It is the conditioned.” Question: 
“I asked about the unconditioned. Why did you reply, ‘It is the conditioned’?” Answer: 
“Existence is established on account of nonexistence, and nonexistence is revealed with 
existence. If existence is not originally established, whence arises nonexistence?”19
Question: “What is the middle way?” Answer: “It is the sides.” Question: “I asked about 
the middle way. Why did you reply, ‘It is the sides’? Answer: “The sides are established on 
account of the middle, and the middle arises on account of the sides. . . . Thus, we know 
that the middle and the sides are established through mutual dependence and are both 
impermanent.”20
In both passages, the answering master’s first reply is disruptive to the questioner, 
which might help to dislodge the latter’s habitual and dualistic thinking. Then, once 
the questioner has revealed his perplexity in a second question, the master imme-
diately provides a rationale for his original response. The two passages provide us 
additional materials for exploring T2, to which we now turn.
To designate a thing is basically to assign it an individual identity through 
 differentiation and contrast. By giving a thing the designation “X,” we take it to be 
an X and differentiate it from Ys, Zs, and other non-Xs. Indeed, the nominal word 
“X” makes sense and can perform its referring function only by differentiating 
its own referents from non-Xs, and we can always coin a word, say, “non-X” to 
 refer to non-Xs. For the sake of convenience, let us here treat “X” and “non-X” 
as words of contrast, not just differentiation. The functioning of nominal words, 
then, presupposes the fundamental contrast between such words “X” and “non-X,” 
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and between such things Xs and non-Xs. Significantly, this contrast involves inter-
dependence, too. The word “X” is meaningful and refers to Xs only by depending 
on the meaningful “non-X,” which refers to non-Xs. Likewise, Xs are Xs only by 
 virtue of being not non-Xs; therefore, they acquire their identity by depending on 
non-Xs.
However, our habitual thinking induces us to attend to contrast and opposition, 
but not interdependence. We tend to treat individual words as independent of other 
words and the larger context. We tend to reify and entify the referents of words, tak-
ing them to be substantial, independent, and distinctly demarcated entities. We then 
come to have a definitive understanding of the myriad things: they as linguistic refer-
ents are taken as definitively such and such as dictated by their referring expressions. 
They thus become objects of attachment (and aversion), which, for Chan Buddhism, 
is a chief obstacle to spiritual freedom.
For Chan masters, words do not represent realities, nor does their use ascribe to 
the referents any real and determinate form or nature. The core teaching of formless-
ness (wuxiang 無相) in the Platform Sūtra can be construed as cautioning against 
such an ascription.21 The forms negated here are dualistic and/or determinate forms 
that we habitually impose on the myriad things. Remarkably, Huangbo Xiyun asserts 
that “If you say there definitively is empty space, then empty space differs from 
 dharma body. . . . If you don’t understand [empty space definitively] as empty space, 
then empty space is dharma body. . . . Empty space and dharma body are not differ-
ent.”22 To understand X definitively as X is to ascribe to it a determinate form, a fixed 
self-same identity, which intrinsically differentiates it from non-X things and easily 
results in attachment to X. For Huangbo, a Buddha is one who is free from all forms. 
This freedom consists not in the complete cessation of forms but in not clinging to 
forms or imposing determinate forms on things.
If things are bereft of determinate form, then, although they are endowed with 
various non-determinate forms, they are not intrinsically different from each other. 
There is no determinacy or fixed self-identity that differentiates one thing from others. 
Thus, Huangbo speaks of the sameness, or non-difference, between empty space and 
dharma body, affliction and enlightenment, life-and-death (saṃsāra) and nirvāṇa.23 
The subject-object unity that a Chan master experiences at the moment of awakening 
may also contribute to this nondualistic position.
Let us now return to the thirty-six pairs. Though people tend to see the two things 
of each pair as opposite to, and incompatible with, each other, the Platform Sūtra 
highlights their interdependence. Quotation D refers to the “darkness and light” pair 
to illustrate this point. Darkness and light are interdependent for at least two reasons. 
First, darkness arises from the diminishing of light, light from the brightening of dark-
ness, so darkness and light originate from one another. Second, darkness and light 
are each revealed by the other. Darkness is darkness because it is contrasted with 
light, and brought into relief by, light, and likewise for, light. For Chan, darkness and 
light have neither independence nor determinate, self-same identity. They are mutu-
ally dependent, supportive, and even inclusive.24
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However, it is much less clear how the sun can originate from, or depend upon, 
the moon. In addition, in what sense is the formless reality revealed by, and so 
 dependent on, the myriad things that are endowed with forms?
As is well known, Indian Buddhism laid great emphasis on the notion of de-
pendent origination ( pratītyasamutpāda). The Mādhyamika philosopher Nāgārjuna 
(ca. 150 –250) understood the relationship of dependency comprehensively, in such 
a way that it includes even relations of notional dependence (such as that between 
the concepts “cause” and “effect”). He even went so far as to contend that a father 
and his son are interdependent. Similarly, the Chinese Mādhyamikas Sengzhao and 
Jizang stated that there is no existence without nonexistence, no nonexistence 
 without existence. Above, we saw the assertion that existence is established on ac-
count of nonexistence. These claims appear to conflate existential dependence and 
notional dependence. After all, how can a father depend existentially on the exis-
tence of his son? How can an existent son depend on something nonexistent?
These questions can be answered if we give weight to notional dependence and 
recall the aforesaid suggestion that Xs are Xs only by depending on non-Xs. Our  daily 
experience of things, it seems, is generally conditioned by the relation of notional 
dependence such that we cannot bypass the relation and focus solely on that of ex-
istential dependence. In our actual epistemic situation, in other words, we cannot 
sever existential dependence from notional dependence. If no son is cognized by 
virtue of the concept of “son,” there exists no father as known through the concept 
of “father.” Similarly, we can cognize something as existent, involving the concept 
of existence, only when we are aware of nonexistent items of which the concept of 
nonexistence can be predicated. Consequently, or so it seems, from our epistemic 
point of view there is no existence without nonexistence, and vice versa.
Thus, assuming that the correlated words/concepts are regarded as interdepen-
dent, the two things in each of the thirty-six pairs should be interdependent, too. This, 
as far as I can tell, is how we can make sense of T2 and speak of the sun and the 
moon as depending on, or even originating from, each other. Meanwhile, the form-
less in the pairs is actually the formless as conceptually cognized as such, not the 
inconceivable formless reality, if any, and so can easily be taken to depend on things 
that are endowed with forms. Applying this point beyond the thirty-six pairs, we 
can say that an X is never an X by itself, never something definitively determined 
by the word “X.” Rather, it is an X only by depending on things that are non-Xs. T2, 
in actual fact, can be taken to indicate the interdependence and interrelatedness 
of all things.
Quotations A and B instruct one to stay away from the two sides and speak of the 
elimination of the two items of each pair. Elsewhere, the Platform Sūtra explains that 
staying away from two sides consists in having no delusion both within and without, 
and this means that one must be free from attachment, inwardly to emptiness and 
outwardly to forms.25 Thus, “staying away” mainly involves the cessation of attach-
ment. The line in quotation B, “while within forms, be free from forms,” also indi-
cates that it is attachment, not things in the world as revealed by our epistemic 
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apparatus, that one needs to forsake. In light of our discussion so far, then, it is clear 
that the sūtra does not mean to eliminate the two things in interdependence. Indeed, 
eliminating such things would unwisely lead to the cessation of all forms, and of all 
words and concepts.
If, say, darkness and light are in fact interdependent and interinclusive, then in-
dependent and distinctly demarcated darkness and light are to be negated. Thus, 
what are to be eliminated, aside from any attachment involved, are the two things of 
each pair taken to be opposite to, and independent from, each other, or the two 
things as objects of attachment and definitive understanding. Such things are our 
conceptual constructs, found nowhere in the world of one’s awakened mind. Hence, 
T3 is stated as the elimination of the two things in opposition.
Clearly, T3 represents the dismissal of dualistic thinking. Here, we understand 
dualistic thinking as that which discriminates the two things of a pair, assigns them 
determinate forms and incompatible natures, and often values one and devalues the 
other, resulting in partiality for one and aversion to the other. For instance, given the 
pairing of speech and sacred silence, one may discriminate between them and priv-
ilege sacred silence over speech. The problems with this are not hard to find. The 
privileged silence, being conceptually delineated from speech, becomes limited by 
speech. It also becomes an object of conceptualization and attachment. Once this 
has occurred, it can hardly be sacred and silent. As we saw above, Huangbo Xiyun 
speaks of the nonduality or sameness of speech and silence. The Platform Sūtra 
states that what is negated by the “no” in its notion of “no-thought” are afflictions 
that arise from dualistic ideas. The sūtra’s fundamental teaching of nonabidingness 
(wuzhu 無住) implies that one must not abide in, or cling to, either of the two things 
of a pair.26 It would surely dismiss dualistic thinking.
Since T3 concerns the dissolution of attachment and conceptual construction, it 
also relates to the practice of Chan. As one already lives in one’s original mind, there 
is no need to seek it or affirm it. What is required for the manifestation of the mind, 
according to Baizhang Huaihai 百丈懷海 (749–814), is to do the following:27
Just cut off the two-sided sentence. Cut off the sentence “it is existent” and the sentence 
“it is not existent.” Cut off the sentence “it is nonexistent” and the sentence “it is not non-
existent.” Let neither side leave traces in you. Let neither side take hold of you. . . . It is 
neither profane nor sacred, neither light nor darkness.
For Baizhang, Chan practitioners should neither attach themselves to words nor 
 engage in dualistic thinking. One is here advised to cut off contrary sentences or 
thoughts such as “it is existent” and “it is nonexistent.”
Meanwhile, although Baizhang distinguishes living words (shengyu 生語), that 
is, negative expressions that deny things, from dead words (siyu 死語), that is, posi-
tive expressions that posit things as existent, and recommends the use of the for-
mer, he is well aware that even living words are provisional, used for therapeutic 
purposes.28 Consequently, one is also advised to cut off such sentences or thoughts 
as “it is not existent” and “it is not nonexistent.” What one really needs to cut off, 
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again, are one’s attachments to the sentences and to the related referents and 
states of  affairs.
According to quotation C, as the two things depend on each other, one may form 
the idea of the middle way. In addition, by staying away from the two sides, one may 
realize the middle way in the form of “neither X nor non-X.” Thus, we have T4 as the 
realization of the middle way of nonduality.29
To realize the middle way is not to attain a completely thoughtless state of quies-
cence. This point can be observed from the teaching of no-thought. The practice of 
no-thought means to see all things without clinging to anything, to reach all places 
without clinging to any place; by contrast, refraining from any thinking whatsoever is 
termed a one-sided view. Typically, Chan training aims at dismantling one’s habitual 
dualistic thinking and cultivating a mind of nonattachment. Such a mind responds to 
the myriad things without abiding therein and follows freely along with the myriad 
circumstances. The middle way realized, then, must be inclusive, rather than exclu-
sive, of one’s experiences of the world.
Meanwhile, the middle way is that of nonduality, and the notion of nonduality 
can be construed in two different senses. First, in light of T3, one stays away from the 
two sides and eliminates the two things in opposition or as objects of attachment. 
One then transcends all dualities. This is the first sense of “nonduality,” which re-
quires little further explanation. The middle way here is of the form “(It is) neither 
X nor non-X,” where X and non-X are both objects of attachment.30 We note that 
the transcendence of duality and the linguistic form of double negation recur in the 
Perfection of Wisdom (prajñāpāramitā) literature and the Mādhyamika treatises.
Second, in light of T2, the two things of a pair, X and non-X, are interdependent, 
interrelated, even interinclusive. As indicated above, both X and non-X are in them-
selves devoid of any determinate form or self-same identity. X is not definitively X, 
not intrinsically different from non-X, and is in some sense non-X. This is the second 
sense of “nonduality,” and the middle way is of the form “X and non-X are nondual” 
or “X is non-X.”
Although this second sense of “nonduality” is not explicit in the four quotations, 
the idea can readily be seen in the Platform Sūtra. Throughout the text, the authors 
acknowledge the interinclusion and nonduality of buddhas (the sacred) and sentient 
beings (the profane). Above all, of the “affliction and enlightenment” pair, it is em-
phasized that affliction is itself enlightenment. The sentence “affliction is enlighten-
ment” serves the heuristic function of stimulating one to strive for enlightenment 
amid all one’s afflictions. However, it has an ontological import, too. Just as sunshine 
shimmers through an all-cloudy sky, the light of enlightenment glimmers in one’s 
mind of afflictions, which makes possible one’s becoming awakened in a single 
 moment of thought. In addition, the view that the myriad things, afflictions included, 
are contained in, or even the same as, self-nature also connotes the affirmation of 
the sentence insofar as enlightenment is the awakening dimension of self-nature.31 
Affliction and enlightenment are nondual in the sense of not being intrinsically dif-
ferent. The same can be said of other pairs, to varying degrees.32
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Now, with the first sense of “nonduality,” one is discouraged from treating the 
two things of a pair as real and determinate entities and from attaching oneself to 
them. The second sense of “nonduality” serves to resolve the antithesis of contrary 
words or concepts and prevent one from taking their referents to be distinctly demar-
cated. In both cases, one might become aware of the provisionality of the words 
used. Thus, the employment of the linguistic strategy may refrain the hearer from 
being seduced, as noted in the beginning of this essay, by the use of words into 
 reifying their referents, taking the latter to be substantial and distinctly demarcated 
entities and becoming attached to them.
Finally, Chan self-reflexively forgoes any attachment to the middle way. Insofar 
as the two concepts “middle way” and “two sides” are interdependent, if one elimi-
nates the two sides, one needs to detach from the middle way, too. As the Platform 
Sūtra puts it, “if there is no thought [that attaches to external objects], no-thought 
is not established, either.”33 Still, different concepts serve different functions by con-
veying different significances or indicating different objects of experience. Conse-
quently, concepts such as “middle way” and “nonduality” are far more suitable than 
their contraries for helping to cure the illness of dualistic thinking, although they, like 
medicines, must not themselves be clung to.
IV
In the preceding section, we reconstructed the linguistic strategy of the Platform Sūtra 
in accordance with four different themes. Given the provisional and therapeutic 
character of Chan language, the strategy would not be fixed in form, but would allow 
for different applications. We now examine the strategy from a broader perspective 
by elucidating its correlated way of thinking and relating it to post-Tang encounter 
dialogue in Chan Buddhism.
Assuming that language and thought are deeply correlated, we can see the 
 linguistic strategy as reflecting a characteristic Chan way of thinking. Arguably, our 
daily experience is impregnated with concepts. However, according to Chan, con-
cepts are originally interdependent: they connect to their contrary concepts just as 
they connect to their intended referents. Here, one begins with a pair of contrary 
concepts. Given the reasons discussed in section 3, one comes to recognize the in-
terdependence of the two concepts and of the two things referred to by them. This 
recognition leads to two complementary options. On the one hand, one negates the 
two things qua independent entities or objects of attachment and refrains from 
 becoming attached to them. On the other, one comprehends the interinclusion of 
the two things and their nonduality. These two options, together, counter habitual 
dualistic thinking and replace it with a nondual way of thinking that dovetails with 
Chan views of the way things are.
Consider, for example, the “matter and emptiness” pair. One may think of matter 
and emptiness as singly determinate and mutually distinct. For many people, attach-
ment to matter is the de facto mode of being, whereas some Mahāyāna Buddhists 
may attach themselves to emptiness. Here, Chan would replace this with a nondual-
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istic way of thinking that involves such thoughts as “matter and emptiness are inter-
dependent,” “neither matter nor emptiness,” and “matter is emptiness.” A Chan 
master, especially one who acts directly from self-nature without attachment, can 
then oscillate freely between saying, negatively, “neither matter nor emptiness,” and 
saying, positively, “matter is emptiness.”34
As implied in quotation A, the linguistic strategy was to be used for explaining 
Chan’s doctrine. However, the relevant passages do not contain much doctrine. 
Rather, they contain mainly instruction on how to understand and use secular and 
Buddhist concepts. This still reveals a specific way of seeing oneself and the world, 
though it may also suggest that Chan is chary of establishing its own doctrines. 
 Meanwhile, the strategy has the heuristic function of engaging the hearer in Chan 
practice. After recognizing the interdependence of pairs of concepts and things, 
one may be induced to cut off attachments to them. With proper training, one may 
eventually become awakened and experience one’s mind as being one with the 
 myriad things.
According to quotation B, if one knows how to use the thirty-six pairs, one can 
understand all Buddhist sūtras. The authors of the Platform Sūtra seem to believe 
that the linguistic strategy or its correlated way of thinking finely captures the quin-
tessence of Mahāyāna Buddhist scriptures. It lies beyond the scope of this essay to 
examine to what extent this belief is tenable. We can only make brief remarks.
The Platform Sūtra refers to the Diamond Sūtra a few times, so that sūtra is worthy 
of our consideration. Since we are here concerned with the way of thinking, not 
doctrinal teaching, we perhaps need only to consider that sūtra’s famous paradoxical 
formula that what is said to be X is not X, and so is called X. This formula nicely 
serves the function of emptying the referent of the word “X” while indicating the 
provisionality of the word. Like the strategy, it helps one to eschew attachment to the 
referents of words. Apart from this, it rather reminds us of Baizhang Huaihai’s claim 
that a Buddhist teaching consists of three conjoined phrases such as, for example, 
“a bodhisattva, is not a bodhisattva, so is called a bodhisattva” and “dharma, not 
 dharma, not not-dharma.”35 Baizhang appears to regard the phrase “so is called a 
bodhisattva” as resulting from the negation of a negation, and this in turn reminds us 
of the celebrated “mountains are mountains” discourse by the Song-dynasty Chan 
master Qingyuan Weixin 青原惟信.36 In any case, the linguistic strategy of the 
 Platform Sūtra differs from all these in its exploitation of pairs of things and the con-
sequent emphasis on interdependence and nonduality.
Another important scripture to consider is the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra, which 
the Platform Sūtra quotes several times. It is well known that Chinese Buddhism owes 
a lot to this sūtra for its nondualistic orientation of thinking, especially the chapter on 
entering the Dharma-gate of nonduality. However, the nonduality stressed in this 
chapter comes closer to the first sense of the notion of nonduality, noted in section 3, 
than to the second sense. For instance, one bodhisattva claims that darkness and light 
form a duality, but in reality there is neither darkness nor light, so there is really no 
duality. Another bodhisattva avers that the real and the unreal form a duality, yet one 
who truly sees reality sees neither the real nor the unreal. We do find here the famous 
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Heart Sūtra statement that matter is emptiness; however, the chapter explains the 
statement to mean that the very nature (prakṛti) of matter (but not matter as such) 
is emptiness.37 Surely, the second sense of nonduality can still be traced back to 
 Indian Mahāyāna texts. Nevertheless, we cannot neglect the strong influence of 
 traditional Chinese thought in general, and Daoist thought in particular, which is 
holistic and somehow nondualistic, tending to see, for example, the sacred and the 
profane as interinclusive.
In passing, it may not be out of place here to remark on the connection between 
the linguistic strategy and the Madhyamaka tradition. Both the Perfection of Wisdom 
literature and the tradition influenced the Platform Sūtra. On a few occasions, the 
sūtra refers to things as illusory or unreal. Regarding the strategy, the idea of no-
tional dependence and the transcendence of duality should have to do with Madhya-
maka. However, we cannot go too far in relating the strategy to Indian Madhyamaka. 
The sūtra does not clearly use the term “emptiness” in the Indian Mādhyamika 
sense of being devoid of uncaused, independent, and permanent nature/existence 
(svabhāva). Where it speaks of the emptiness of human nature, for example, the 
 context makes it evident that “emptiness” is used in the sense of being similar to 
empty space. That said, the strategy’s emphasis on nonattachment, quotation C, and 
the second sense of nonduality may all be influenced by Chinese Madhyamaka.
On the whole, while various elements of the way of thinking concerned can be 
found in Buddhist sūtras and other Buddhist or non-Buddhist texts, the Platform Sūtra 
is unique and ingenious in conjoining these elements to form a way of thinking 
that induces one to rethink the relationship between contrary concepts/things, with 
a view to cutting off attachments and freeing one’s mind from habitual dualistic 
thinking.
Although this essay is not meant to dwell upon post-Tang encounter dialogue, 
we may briefly consider two relevant encounter dialogues, which would help in 
 ascertaining the characteristics of the linguistic strategy of the Platform Sūtra. The 
first dialogue is a discourse about the Chan master Qingliang Wenyi 清涼文益 
 (885–958):
A monk asked: “I will not ask about the finger [that points to the moon]. Just what is the 
moon?” The master said: “What is the finger that you don’t ask about?” The monk then 
asked: “I will not ask about the moon. Just what is the finger?” The master said: “The 
moon.” The monk asked: “I asked about the finger. Why did you answer ‘the moon’?” The 
master said: “Because you asked about the finger.”38
This discourse is reminiscent of the two passages quoted above from the Dunwu 
rudao yaomen lun (Dazhu Huihai [a]), and the master’s replies would be perplexing 
had we not seen similar tactics there. Unlike the passages, however, the master did 
not bother to explain in a comprehensible way the rationale for his second reply 
(“the moon”). As a result, the discourse is like a typical Chan encounter dialogue 
wherein the master’s words transgress common sense and dislodge the interlocutor’s 
habitual way of thinking.
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The second dialogue was implausibly attributed to Huineng’s direct disciple, 
Nanyang Huizhong 南陽慧忠 (683?– 769?):
Someone asked [the master Nanyang Huizhong]: “What is the real form (shixiang 實相) 
[of all things]?” The master said: “Bring me the unreal [form first].” The person said: “The 
unreal is unobtainable.” The master said: “If even the unreal is unobtainable, what is the 
point of asking about the real?”39
The real and the unreal constitute one of the thirty-six pairs in the Platform Sūtra. On 
account of their contrariness and interdependence, the master directed the interlocu-
tor’s attention to the unreal. In light of the unobtainability of the unreal and the 
 codependence of the real and the unreal, he then indicated the futility of asking 
about the real. Both the real and the unreal, being unobtainable, are seemingly elim-
inated.40 However, what is primarily negated are the items taken as determinate 
and properly identified by the words “real” and “unreal.” Significantly, hearing the 
unobtainability of the real can disrupt the interlocutor’s deep-rooted belief in the 
existence of a sublime and linguistically identifiable reality. Overall, these two 
 dialogues can be seen as applications of the sūtra’s linguistic strategy, although they 
both have a clear encounter dialogue flavor.
V
In this essay I have analyzed and reconstructed the main linguistic strategy in the 
Platform Sūtra. The strategy, based on the interdependence of pairs of concepts, 
makes provisional use of words to lead the interlocutor to the realization of the 
 middle way of nonduality. It may help to free the interlocutor’s mind from attach-
ment, definitive understanding, and habitual dualistic thinking. Given the approach 
of the essay, I cannot examine in greater detail the strategy’s relationships to other 
Chan texts. Nevertheless, the exposition attempted here should shed some light on 
the sūtra’s linguistic thought as well as the way of thinking endorsed by Southern 
Chan in the Tang dynasty.
For Chan, the experience of awakening can in no way be replaced by linguistic 
understanding. However, this does not constitute a reason for disregarding the value 
of language. What the Platform Sūtra cautions against is not the provisional use of 
words, but our attachment to words and their referents. We have seen that the 
 employment of the linguistic strategy may refrain the hearer from being seduced 
by the use of words into reifying their referents and becoming attached to them. 
 Living as we do in the world of everyday experience, we cannot hope to escape 
from language. Yet, we can seek to go beyond the ensnaring enchantment of 
 dualistic language and use words in ways that accord better with the originally 
 limpid and free-flowing nature of our mind. Just as the Platform Sūtra instructs 
“while within forms, be free from forms,” we may also say, analogically, “while 
 within words, be free from words.” This saying should sum up this sūtra’s attitude 
 toward language.
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Notes
The author is grateful to Youru Wang and two anonymous referees of Philosophy East 
and West for their valuable critical comments on two earlier drafts of this essay.
The following abbreviation is used in the Notes:
SDZ  Shinsan Dainihon zokuzōkyō 卍新纂大日本續藏經. In CBETA Chinese Elec-
tronic Tripiṭaka Collection Version 2014. Taipei: Chinese Buddhist Electronic 
Text Association. http://www.cbeta.org.
1   –   See Wright 1992 and 1998 and Nelson 2010. I shall not address this particular 
issue in this essay.
2   –   I understand the notion of original mind to mean our mind in its unclouded, 
limpid, nonabiding, and free state. For Chan, such a mind is somehow all- 
pervasive, like empty space (xukong 虛空). The mind is original because we 
already live in it, although, being clouded by afflictions (fannao 煩惱) and 
 habitual sedimentations of dualistic thinking, it is not fully manifest to us. 
 Meanwhile, the experience of awakening is that of the mind being realized and 
becoming manifest, which in the Platform Sūtra is compared to a great sea that 
causes the waters of various flowing streams to merge into a whole.
3   –   Dazhu Huihai 大珠慧海, a pupil of Mazu Daoyi 馬祖道一 (709–788), charac-
teristically avers that “deluded people seek within written words, while disillu-
sioned ones turn to the mind for awakening.” See Dazhu Huihai (b), in SDZ 
63 : 28a1–2 (= vol. 63, p. 28, col. a, line 1–2); cf. Dazhu Huihai (b), in SDZ 
63 : 28c19–22. In this essay, all translations from the Chinese texts are mine.
4   –   Huangbo Duanji chanshi Wanling lu, in SDZ 68 : 21c13–14; see also Wang 
2003, pp. 117–121.
5   –   Dazhu Huihai (b), in SDZ 63 : 29b15–18. Notably, being formless, limpid, and 
freely functioning, here the mind is also said to be free from speech.
6   –   For discussions on related issues, see Faure 1993, pp. 195–216, and Wang 
2003.
7   –   For recent scholarship on the subject, see McRae 2003, Jorgensen 2005, and 
Schlütter and Teiser 2012. There is no clear scholarly consensus on the author-
ship of (the earliest available versions of ) the Platform Sūtra. It was once thought 
that this sūtra was created by Shenhui 神會 (684 –758) or his disciples as part 
of an attack on the “Northern School” of Chan, represented by Shenxiu 神秀 
(606?–706). However, many scholars have dismissed this view, and some 
 suggest that the sūtra might be authored by Chan thinkers related to the 
 Oxhead (Niutou) School; see McRae 2003 and Schlütter’s Introduction to 
Schlütter and Teiser 2012. On the other hand, Jorgensen (2005, p. 672) sur-
mises that the Platform Sūtra is probably a product of southern branches of 
Shenhui’s lineage.
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8   –   See Yang 2001, p. 64. In about the past one hundred years, scholars have found 
and edited two Dunhuang versions of the Platform Sūtra that may date as early 
as about 780 c.e. and are until now the most reliable texts for understanding the 
sūtra in its original form. The first Dunhuang version is included in volume 48 
of the Taishō shinshū daizōkyō under the title Nanzong dunjiao zuishang 
dasheng mohe bore boluomijing: Liuzu Huineng dashi yu Shaozhou Dafansi 
shifa tanjing 南宗頓教最上大乘摩訶般若波羅蜜經六祖惠能大師於韶州大梵寺
施法壇經. For an English translation of this version, refer to Yampolsky 2012. 
As this version has many errors, I mainly rely on Yang 2001, which contains a 
well-collated text of the second and better Dunhuang version. Incidentally, 
Yang 2001 includes as an appendix the Daijōji version of the Platform Sūtra, 
which was eventually based on the Huixin version dated at 967 c.e.
9   –   Yang 2001, pp. 19–20, 37–38. It is here indicated that people who slander 
scriptural teachings are those who advocate the extinction of thought.
10   –   Thus, in the essay I refer to Chan monks who belonged to Shenhui’s lineage, the 
Hongzhou School, and the Shitou School, but not the “Northern School.” Many 
scholars have questioned the traditional opposition between the “Northern 
School’s gradual awakening” and the “Southern School’s sudden awakening.” 
Here I follow the view held by some scholars that while the doctrines of North-
ern Chan may be more sudden and nondual than the manner in which Shenhui 
or the “Southern School” has portrayed them, there are still significant differ-
ences in practice-related thought between Northern and Southern Chan, with 
the latter being more nondualistic in its orientation; see Gong 2006, pp. 128–
181 and Sorensen 2012.
11   –   Although there are a few philosophical works, especially in Chinese, that deal 
with the relevant passages in the Platform Sūtra at some length, they are mostly 
lacking in rigorous analysis, depth, and systematic completeness. For a related 
study based on a problematic Yijing 易經 reading of the thirty-six pairs, see 
Cheng 1992.
12   –   Yang 2001, pp. 60 – 61. As “nature and form” constitutes only one of the thirty- 
six pairs (see below), the phrase “nature and form” does not make good sense 
here. In light of quotation B, this should be replaced by “self-nature” (zixing 
自­性), which means one’s true nature qua original mind.
13   –   As noted above, the experience of awakening, that of the realization of original 
mind, is in the Platform Sūtra compared to a great sea that brings together the 
waters of various streams into a whole. This implies that one is, at the moment, 
experiencing a dynamic form of subject-object unity such that nothing that 
is experienced is really outside one’s original mind. The mind, then, is all- 
pervasive, like empty space. It may be said that the myriad things are contained 
in original mind and become what they are normally taken to be, qua distinct 
mind-independent particulars, when they emerge from the mind. However, a 
full investigation of this topic lies outside the scope of this essay.
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14   –   The text lists twenty pairs for the third group, making it actually thirty-seven 
pairs in total.
15   –   Yang 2001, pp. 63– 64. The word “emptiness” characterizes the nature of origi-
nal mind, which is like empty space given its formlessness and pervasiveness; 
see Yang 2001, p. 30. Derivatively, the word may also be used to characterize 
our unawakened mind.
16   –   Of course, those who have awakened to self-nature and act directly from it can 
most easily act with nonattachment; see Yang 2001, pp. 19–20: “If your thoughts 
arise directly from self-nature, then, while you see, hear, feel, and know, you 
are not tainted by the myriad objects and are always free.”
17   –   Yang 2001, pp. 112–113. Cf. Yampolsky 2012, p. 173 n. 258. If, as noted in 
quotation A, a Chan master’s doctrinal speech should involve pairs of things, it 
is recommended for the master to mention, among possible others, “profane” 
when asked about “sacred.” As we shall see below, the tactic taught here is 
applied in texts ascribed to Shenhui and someone belonging to his lineage, and 
some members of the lineage could be behind the production of the Platform 
Sūtra. On the other hand, if one thinks that the sūtra was authored by Chan 
monks of the Oxhead School, which descended from the Sanlun/Madhyamaka 
tradition, we may note that the tactic bears resemblance to the view proposed 
by the Chinese Mādhyamika philosopher Jizang 吉藏 (549 – 631) that the word 
“matter” can mean emptiness as well as matter, a view that can be traced 
backed to the tradition’s forerunner Sengzhao 僧肇 (374?– 414). But I am only 
suggesting that the tactic, though not found in the earliest available versions, 
should be acceptable to the authors of the Platform Sūtra. Meanwhile, as 
 mentioned above, given our reconstructive approach, I also appeal to Tang 
Chan texts other than the sūtra to reveal certain dimensions of Chan’s linguistic 
tactics and style of thought. Thus, this essay is not quite a textual study of a 
 certain version of the sūtra, but seeks to reconstruct a linguistic strategy to 
shed light on early Chan thought. All this should justify our reference to the 
passage concerned.
18   –   Yang 2001, p. 64.
19   –   Dazhu Huihai (a), in SDZ 63 : 22a15–16. Jinhua Jia (2006, p. 61) suggests that 
this text probably records the discourses of Dazhu Huihai’s preceptor, Daozhi 
道智, who belonged to Shenhui’s lineage, but not of Dazhu himself. The 
 Chinese terms for “unconditioned” and “conditioned” comprise, respectively, 
the Chinese characters for “nonexistence” (wu 無) and “existence” (you 有). The 
answering monk presumably thought that what works for the latter pair works 
for the former as well.
20   –   Dazhu Huihai (a), in SDZ 63 : 22a21–24. A similar dialogue occurs in the 
 recorded sayings of Shenhui (Yang 1996, p. 66).
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21   –   Yang 2001, pp. 19–20. It is here stated to the effect that a Buddhist sage dis-
tinguishes well the forms of external things without thereby deviating from 
self-nature. The notion of formlessness by no means implies the elimination of 
all forms.
22   –   Huangboshan Duanji chanshi chuanxin fayao, in Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 
48 : 381a15–18 (= vol. 48, p. 381, col. a, line 15–18).
23   –   By “sameness” here is meant that, say, X and non-X are not intrinsically differ-
ent, but not that they are identical in the sense of being the same in each and 
every respect.
24   –   The Can tong qi, attributed to Shitou Xiqian 石頭希遷 (700 –790), states that 
there is light in darkness, and darkness in light; see Can tong qi, in Taishō shin-
shū daizōkyō 51 : 459b15–16. The view that the two things of a pair originate 
from one another reminds us of the idea in the Daoist classic Laozi that exis-
tence and nonexistence give birth to each other.
25   –   Yang 2001, p. 55. According to Dazhu Huihai (a), in SDZ 63 : 23c16 –20, 
 “staying away from two sides” consists in the mind’s outwardly not clinging to 
external objects and inwardly not inducing delusive ideas.
26   –   Yang 2001, pp. 17–19. For the Platform Sūtra, our mind should flow freely with 
the changes of thoughts and things, while abidingness inevitably results in 
bondage.
27   –   Baizhang guanglu, in SDZ 68 : 6c24 –7a3; see also SDZ 68 : 7c21–8a8.
28   –   Baizhang guanglu, in SDZ 68 : 7b14 –24, 11b21–23. In the Baizhang guanglu, 
SDZ 68 : 12c14 –16, Baizhang states that “all verbal teachings are like [remedies 
for] curing diseases; just as the diseases are various, so are the remedies. 
 Therefore, one sometimes teaches ‘there is Buddha,’ sometimes ‘there is no 
Buddha.’ ”
29   –   While the term “middle way” is absent from our Dunhuang text, the text (Yang 
2001, p. 77) has Huineng advise his pupils to realize a quiescent state of being 
neither moving nor still, neither arising nor perishing, neither affirmation nor ne-
gation, which is termed the “great way” (dadao 大道). This realization is presum-
ably a meditative experience, but we need not confine T4 to such an experience.
30   –   If one is concerned with the ineffable original mind, “neither X nor non-X” 
would indicate the conceptual indeterminability of the mind. As the Dunhuang 
text does not address this topic explicitly, we should bypass it.
31   –   Yang 2001, pp. 24 –25, 30 –31, 52, 72–73. Again, the copula “is” in the sen-
tence does not express a relation of strict identity.
32   –   Notional dependence, the dismissal of definitive understanding (à la Huangbo), 
and the view that all things are contained in self-nature may all contribute to 
this startling idea.
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33   –   Yang 2001, p. 19; cf. Dazhu Huihai (a), in SDZ 63 : 22a21–24, 23c16 –21. 
 According to the Baizhang guanglu, in SDZ 68 : 7b7–9, a great teacher is one 
who “does not abide in all things existent and nonexistent, does not abide in 
nonabidingness, and does not understand [this not-abiding definitively] as 
not-abiding.”
34   –   We know that Chan tradition attributed to Mazu Daoyi these two sayings: “this 
mind is Buddha” and “neither mind nor Buddha.”
35   –   Baizhang guanglu, in SDZ 68 : 8a10 –12.
36   –   Wudeng huiyuan, in SDZ 80 : 361c12–16. For an in-depth analysis of the dis-
course, see Abe 1985, pp. 3–24.
37   –   For the Sanskrit passages and Chinese translations, see Vimalakīrtinirdeśa: 
Transliterated Sanskrit Text Collated with Tibetan and Chinese Translations 
2004, pp. 334 –335, 344 –345, 348–349. Refer to Ho 2012 for related discus-
sions on the nonduality of speech and silence and that of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa.
38   –   Jingde chuandeng lu, in Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 51 : 398c23–26. Given the 
famous Buddhist simile of a moon-pointing finger, “finger” and “moon” can 
well form a pair of contrary concepts.
39   –   Jingde chuandeng lu, in Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 51 : 244c27–29. For Chan, all 
things are unobtainable (bukede 不可得) because they are nonsubstantial and 
empty of determinate nature.
40   –   One can also take the two dialogues as rejecting any idea of a sublime, ineffa-
ble reality (the moon and the real form). As Robert Sharf (2007, p. 228) puts it, 
in a different context: “the moon to which the finger points is another empty 
finger. It is fingers all the way down.”
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